Moldova is a possibility, but they are shielded by Ukraine. Poland has territorial friction with Russia around Kaliningrad - so probably Lithuania as well.
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Moldova just re-elected its Pro-West president Maria Sandu despite repeated Russian interference with the electoral procedure. Her aim is integration into NATO and EU. The question is if sheās going to have enough time.
Even if she doesnāt though, a Russian attack would almost certainly implicate Romania, Moldovaās sister nation and a EU and NATO member.
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Pretty much a vassal state at this point. And looking to stay that way.
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I wouldnāt bank on that mate. I fully expect Le Pen to win next time.
I wouldnāt be surprised. I feel as though Macronās actions have single-handedly guaranteed that.
Who can even unite the opposition to the far-right? For sure Melenchonās ego seems to not permit him to not run soā¦
Melenchon is possibly held in even higher contempt than she is right now. The best that can be hoped for is a new centrist alliance once Macron is gone.
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Pity heās not sufficiently self-aware to recognise that.
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Considered posting this in the UK Politics thread at first, but Iām not quite clear if itās just the lack of the promised delivery of the Storm Shadow missiles or if itās Ukraine looking to push the UK to do more. If itās just the former, then shame on Starmer, but if itās the latter, then Iām not sure if itās that different from what previous governments have/would have done.
The bit that worries me in that article is this:
On Friday, Starmer appointed Tony Blairās chief of staff Jonathan Powell as national security adviser. Powell has long advocated negotiating with enemies to bring about peace, prompting one Ukraine expert and Labour historian to argue that he might add to pressure on Kyiv to negotiate a truce with Russia. Brian Brivati, a former director of the John Smith Trust, said: āOf course there has to be a deal at some point, but for Trump and Powell it is the end of fighting that counts, which is not the same as peace.ā
European countries doing a cost/benefit analysis and effectively coming to the conclusion without the US, it becomes a forgone conclusion therefore negotiate for peace. Ukraine taking and holding Russian land IMO was partly driven by US election uncertainty, in the event of negotiations. From memory this was not endorsed by the US, but the UK did allow weapons to be used within Russia.
Its a important moment, Storm Shadow is more the symptom. Does the UK break with US policy alignment ? Or does it go it alone/with Europe ?
Ukraine is pushing for the later. I hope its the later. I fear the opposite will happen.
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The UK has absolutely no, none at all, chance to lead anything at all in the European Security Sphere. One thing is Brexit but another is the hard numbers. The UK barely has an army anymore. It produces very little ammunition too. Even after the invasion, defence budget is only so-so up and much of it goes to pay for the cost of the Trident and the carriers.
The French is also in a very badd position, but infinately better compared to the UK in terms of defence and production. Starmer has also refused Ukrainian requests to re-start Storm Shadow production, he has not even visited Kyiv and relations with Ukraine is frictious now (might be news to some here) as Starmer is seen as less pro-Ukraine than the Tories were (true or not, that is the perception in Ukraine).
However, far worse, the collective European production is far, far too low to make up for the US. That is just the truth. I have been harping on about this for years now, but virtually nothing in Europe has happened since the invasion. The German Zeitenwende ? Lolā¦
Lots of words, but budgets donāt lie. Procurement numbers do not lie. There are no large orders placed in defence industry. Only a very small increase on defence spending . That increase would have been regarded as large during other times, during peace and stability, but there is industrial war and it amounts to very little. Have you seen discussions in newspapers of Europeans being angry because governments across Europe are cutting various budget posts, such as heavy important ones like Education and Health Care ? I think not. The increase needdedd in Defence Buddgets must come from some where, and a half percent up, or 0.2, or 0.3; is no where enough.
This is an industrial war and several million shells are used every year by ukraine and Russia. Ukraine needs hundreds of tanks, many hunddred more IFVs, hunddredds more artillery systems. Where are these procurement ordders ? There are barely anyone. UK, Germany andd France has refusedd to re-start SS-Scalp. From production lines re-starting to the time factories can deliver 10 missiles, well, it takes months because they have to re-start production lines!
Itās possible that Europe, principally Germany, France, Italy and Poland; could drastically increase aid; but the time then was yesterday (really last year). I fervently hope, but I see NO SIGN ANYWHERE that parliaments around Europe have been preparing their public for large increases in defence spending. it would be actually quite costly. Far from as costly as Russia winning, but it requires collectively a serious effort.
Massive orders to Rheinmetal (but also South Korea) and other 155 mm producers of 20-30 millions of shells are not there.
So forgive me for being pessimistic.
To be frank, I think many fail to comprehend the large numbers involved here. Many seem to think that if you only give Ukraine a few billions of cash now and then, that it is. Itās not, you have to build equippment, you have to produce enormous amounts of ammunition, you have to place orders in UKR arms industry. This is incredibly lacking now.
The European People have not woken up and smelled the coffee. They think they live in peace time, more interested in the Middle East and Gaza (which we Europeans can hardly afford to do according to Maslows pyramid and basic logic, since while we can change events in Ukraine; we have almost no influence visa vi israel), while Europe is burning and our security is collapsing around us; most people are asleep.
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For the most part i think we are in violent agreement 
I agree on almost all your points. Where I do differ is that I believe the UK can have a leadership role, with winter approaching there is a small window. Next 2/3 weeks critical. Leadership across Europe is probably at an all time low. From my perspective its only Starmer and perhaps Macron that could try fill the void. It would take a monumental shift from where we are today.
For me it needs to happen. Europe needs to at least try. The consequences of not are far worse.
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I agree of course, but I am dejected and out of faith. Most Europeans seem to follow events in Gaza far closer than Ukraine, which means that there is little public pressure on European governments (and they need to be pressed, because they donāt want to lose elections and the increase in defence budgets and cuts elsewhere, must be supported by the public in practice; and I see no such media offensive).
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Itās not enough.
Itās not enough if there is even the slightest chance of direct conflict with Russia. There is no need for armies, nor defence budgets, of the size of we had during the Cold War, itās not that bad. Russia isnāt the USSR; but they are still a great power who can field a million strong land army.
But no European state have stocks of ammunition and equippment of the size one needs for any sort of war that becomes protracted and industrial. And if Russia wins, you only really have a very few years to prepare for their next invasion so time is of the essence.
But I see no one hurrying.
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More on Britainās role and in the last few days, I could have posted much about that if I had bothered to.
https://x.com/EHunterChristie/status/1854999466656362607
"I feared this would be the case. The Starmer-Lammy government is not as committed to helping Ukraine as the previous Tory governments. There is in particular an issue regarding further supplies of Storm Shadows.
More widely, it was clear before he came in as PM that Starmer was hedging too much on the question of UK defence spending increases, and aiming too low, with an unclear commitment to even a very minor increase to 2.5% of GDP. That is not enough for this era of grave international danger.
*Starmer has also used worrying language about being in ālockstepā with allies, which is precisely the wrong approach in European alliance politics in the context of the Russia-Ukraine war: *
*Experience has shown, repeatedly, that better outcomes for Ukraine, and hence for European security, come about through having various allies at various times breaking ranks with the emerging consensus and taking bolder steps to assist Ukraine, thereby creating positive peer pressure effects. Poland behaved that way with tanks in 2022. The UK did so under Ben Wallace early in the war and again with Storm Shadow supplies. *
It is that spirit that Britain needs to find again. It is not lockstep movement that is needed but forward movement, alone or with only a handful of other allies if thatās what it takes to get the best outcomes.
European security has already been damaged by the excessive timidity of the Biden-Sullivan duo. We donāt need a British copy of that failed philosophy, especially not in an era of uncertain U.S. commitment."
Edward is a good source, a very sound expert, in case you wondered.
And more from today
https://x.com/KyivIndependent/status/1854995477793579128
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On to some good news:
As corporate debts in Russia balloon under rising interest rates, a wave of bankruptcies could be on the horizon ā Meduza?
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Dear Sirs, I recently returned from almost two weeks in Ukraine. Since October 2022,
,
and
and I have been on seven study trips. It was also a pleasure to welcome
to our team. Her interests and perspectives have allowed me to look at many issues from a different perspective, which confirms how important fresh, external assessments are. After our previous visit, which took place in June this year, I wrote a thread in which I expressed moderate optimism (the entire thread is below and is worth reading in its entirety). My assessment was mainly based on the very good results of mobilization (the act amending issues related to mobilization came into force in mid-May). In my opinion, this was supposed to contribute to the stabilization of the front. However, I noted that when I spoke of optimism, I meant the stabilization of the front. The end of the war, strategy and theory of victory are completely different issues. https://x.com/konrad_muzyka/status/1813684079377969256ā¦ Getting to the point ā the situation does not look good. The trajectory is clearly negative. As you know, I have been emphasizing for months that the key problem to be solved is the issue of personnel levels of line units, especially in infantry units. The Kursk operation has stretched the already small Ukrainian forces even further. The shortage of infantry is compensated by FPV drone attacks and every other available means of attack. Although this causes losses on the Russian side, drones will not replace infantry. Ukrainians will not defend cities and villages with drones alone, and they will not retake the area without the participation of infantry. Considering the number of hot spots and areas of active operation of Ukrainian forces, the presence of newly mobilized units/soldiers is practically imperceptible. Where they appear, there are problems with coordination, training, and general interoperability. Training also needs to be improved to at least partially reflect the realities of the battlefield. Well-trained and led soldiers can fight very effectively, which is a truism, but is of great importance to us (reserve training is practically non-existent here). Lack of proper training and low morale lead to morale breakdowns in some sections of the front. According to The Economist, almost 25% of soldiers leave their positions without permission. As a result, we have a situation in which the Ukrainians not only cannot keep up with replacing losses, but are also losing soldiers at an increasingly rapid rate due to falling morale. In addition, we have a situation in which battalions separated from brigades are scattered across different parts of the front and subordinated to tactical units located on the spot. This again limits combat capabilities. Although this is not a new phenomenon, its scale has increased. Information about a possible Russian offensive in Zaporozhye (we know from our own research that units of the 76th Air Assault Division, transferred some time ago to the Kherson Oblast, are returning to Zaporozhye. Soldiers of the 104th and 237th Air Assault Regiments and the 175th Divisional Reconnaissance Battalion have recently appeared in the Kamiansk region) will probably force the Ukrainian military command to take further fire-fighting action. On the positive side, there are basically no problems with access to 155 mm artillery ammunition. In some places on the front, there is parity in artillery strikes. The methods of Russian military operations have not changed fundamentally. The Russians first try company-level attacks, and if that fails, they move on to the platoon or squad/section level. These attacks, although weak, show that the Russians know well which parts of the front are poorly defended. To their credit, they did not try (for too long) to storm Pokrovsk, but instead transferred their forces and resources to less fortified parts of the front. While Pokrovsk is well fortified, the approaches to it from the west are not. Russia is stepping up attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure, using Shahed/Geran-2 drones and deploying imitators and decoys to map Ukraineās air defense system. Despite these actions, Ukraineās energy system is functioning relatively well given the current situation. However, in the event of a full-scale attack on critical infrastructure, the system may not withstand it, which could result in power supplies being limited to 2-4 hours per day. Many companies are already preparing for this eventuality by installing generators. There is a lot of talk in the Polish information space about the American ban on attacks on targets in the territory of the Russian Federation. However, I believe that lifting this ban will not have a strategic or long-term impact on the course of the war. Certainly not considering the number of available missiles. If Ukraine wants to persuade Russia to join the peace talks, it should first stabilize the front and rebuild its forces enough to be able to conduct offensives, even at the tactical level, and only then will attacks on targets in the Russian Federation begin to bring results. These are interconnected vessels. One without the other will not bring the expected results. Ukraineās long-range drone and cruise missile programs are still under development, and 2025 could see an increased pace of their deployment. I agree with
who said that the election of Donald Trump carries both risks and opportunities. It is currently difficult to clearly assess how his administration will shape its policy towards Ukraine. However, based on previous statements, it can be assumed that he will seek a quick end to the conflict through negotiations, potentially reducing military support and putting pressure on European allies to engage in the region. At this stage, I would not draw too far-reaching conclusions. In short, the number one goal right now is to stabilize the front, rebuild forces in the rear, and develop drone and missile capabilities. Stabilizing the front is absolutely crucial to preserving Ukraineās independence and strengthening its negotiating position. However, there is little evidence that this will be achieved any time soon.
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I feel as though itās simply because Starmer is very much a small-c conservative. Trying to do more here feels like itās almost too radical for him. Not to mention the constraints of the budget which is a perfect excuse for him to say that his hands are tied. Great as a manager, but you have to wonder if heās visionary enough.
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