I think it is imperative that Ukraine get what is required to mount offensives. Long range artillery is and will be needed to defend and counter attack in the south. It’s taking them a long time to push Russia to the east banks and such capability would help. Then there’s the threat of Russians offensives from Crimea and the necessity to be able to counter them.
In the long game if ever possible an offensive on DPR etc to the east is crucial otherwise Russia will just sit there throwing troops at the eastern front. So yes I disagree that Ukraine will sit still whilst absorbing Russian offensives.
They need more from those willing to oblige Ukraine as many will only send defensive weapons which imo have very limited use in the long game.
The Ukrainians have severe problems with artillery depletion. This is a known fact. My point is that without larger quantities of artillery, they do not have the option of retaking Kherson. They may not want to mount such an offensive anyway (yet there is much speculation and some rumours that they indeed want to do this if possible), but it’s nice to have the option so the RU binds up forces.
I am not sure there is data that supports the idea that Russian numerical superiority in the field of artillery is in danger of suffer from enough depletion. I have not seen that. Their maneuver forces have largely been wrecked though. Some artillery too, but in the east their supply lines are short and not half as problematic as Kyiv front. As long as Ukraine cannot interdict forces coming in from Russia, they have a big problem as such.
But I agree that the Ukrainians probably will and must continue to defend. But to at least threaten Kherson would be valuable.
Absurd, not even Vidkun Quisling would contemplate a limited nuclear strike on Norwegian territory.
According to Austrian Putin lover, Geroman:
Some interesting musings:
This thread does not mention it, but Blietzkrieg also involves having several so called echelons. One attacks, strikes deep, second echelon follows after to mop up, first echelon continues to strike deep and mounts quick pincer maneuvers, creating cauldrons on the way forward. A proper blitzkrieg was never planned, since they had no second echelon to follow the first one. A blitzkrieg requires more echelons than one to destroy said cauldrons and link up with supplies. So blitzkrieg was never planned. A Short Victorious War (Special Operation) was. When this failed, they got stuck in a war with forces designed to suppress Ukrainian resistance. Their plan failed spectacularly and the Plan B was , well, was not there.
That wasn’t quite what I said - without question, the Ukrainians need artillery, even without contemplating their use in an offensive. What I said was that in the static war, the numerically inferior Ukrainian artillery is exacting a stiffer toll on the Russian forces than the Russian artillery is managing - not that the Russian artillery is being worn down faster (I suspect it might be, but from a much larger numerical base).
In that sense, maintaining an effective Ukrainian artillery force is in fact critical for UKR hopes, because as long as they are able to attrit the Russian mobile forces effectively in the static war, time is probably on their side.
Oh, sorry. I misread you a bit then. Yes, I agree.
Full analysis: