While this might appear, at first glance, as what you see mass produced by Ukraine and Russia (documentation +some propaganda), it’s worth remembering that this is one single compilation of note and that it’s made for propaganda, probably more than documentation… https://x.com/OSINTWarfare/status/2102419421402894422
It’s still interesting. And I suppose, impressive. The Houthies are no longer just the warband of the Houthies, they have significant manpower (and I mean significant) and the apparatus of state, as well as some bloody minded ingenuity. Their missile and drone program is for instance spectacularly impressive considering their awful industrial base and generally low technological level. But with some Iranian aid, they have built quite the conventional force within the limitations that they have to work with. They have some really smart engineers.
It’s going to be hard for the UN recogniced government to make a come back and drive the Houthies off (and even more unlikely to recapture Sanaa, and you kind of have to recapture your capital within a certain time frame), unless KSA and the Emirates become friends again, that seems at the moment unlikely.
On the other hand, there is no reason to lose all of these commanders, except the propaganda value above. I mean, obviously they could be masked, videos censored and more. https://x.com/BashaReport/status/2102538235813433747
The Saudi airforce is one of the most modern out there and the most capable of their branches. They’ve invested heavily into airpower. Very different to their army. Dare I say, less gruntwork so morale and efficiency isn’t a problem (that might be a lazy assumption but I don’t think it’s wrong).
Saudi Arabia have the toys. But being a pilot over there is more of how connected you are with the royal family as it’s taken as a prestige sort of thing. There is no rigorous process that is followed where only the best are taken.
As in most armies the position of a fighter-pilot is widely considered the apex of the military career. The report pays special attention to pilot training in the Gulf and explains why GCC pilots still have a long way to go to approximate the skill level and professionalism of their colleagues in Western air forces. Because being a fighter-pilot – or, in some respect, any kind of pilot at all – is so prestigious, the princes of the large ruling families often aspire to these positions. As from the general application pool, only a small proportion of them are suited for pilot assignment but, because these armies are anything but meritocracies, those princes who want to, usually end up flying. Pilot performance is continued to be influenced by cultural factors: flyers perform adequately in good conditions with no surprises; once something unexpected occurs, they tend to freeze and make mistakes. Attrition rates in pilot training tend to be far lower in Gulf armies than in, say the Israeli Defense Force or the US Air Force.
Gulf societies remain predominantly tribal societies and tribalism is directly responsible for the enduring weakness of formal institutions, including the armed forces. Tribalism has undermined meritocracy and has sapped the militaries’ effectiveness. The report mentions actual recent examples how the interference of tribal leaders has undercut military reform initiatives and contributed to the assignment of individuals with questionable competence to important positions.
In spite of massive financial investment in these armed forces, from a professional standpoint they remain at best mediocre as their performance in the on-going war in Yemen reminds analysts daily. The lack of meritocracy and the continued weaknesses of the education system (on every level) are just two of the main reasons for this assessment. The UAE has done the most to escape from the long-standing mediocrity of Gulf (and Arab) armies, but despite some advances it has undoubtedly made, it is still affected by the built-in politico-structural and socio-cultural limitations of absolute monarchies.
I don’t disagree with any of that, really. It’s kind of a hard concept to truly articulate and the article does a good job of saying what I was trying to get across. Their airforce is one the most capable in the region and well trained. One doesn’t fly an F16, for example, just because they happen to be royalty. That’s not to say they’re the best in the world but a basic capability through training and aptitude is there. An army grunt picks up a gun, a pilot has to fly a complicated machine thus a certain basic capability is there through the process necessary to attain that ability. Would they perform brilliantly against a peer adversary using the same equipment and an established air defense network. Arguably not. Do they have precision strike capability to handle a campaign against the Houthis? Yes they can and have been doing so for a while.
Also, being in the airforce lends itself to that elite status of society which makes it appealing in a way the regular army isn’t. It’s glamourous, smaller, elite and far less of an immediate danger than an army unit. When almost everyone is of an elite status, elitism itself becomes less stratified unlike the office corp in the regular army.
Houthies have been totally routed today along the Red Sea coast.
2 days ago, Ansar Allah was in the process of taking both Taiz and driving further down the coast, but KSA air strikes and the southern giants have routed them.
Mecca Pact is coming into action. Around a 100 Pakistanis and arounda 100 Turkish troops on the way to KSA as advisors and to set up logistics for more troops and probably aircrafts etc.
The campaign in Yemen, related to the Iran war, is escalating (saana bombed KSA with ballistic missiles today as well). https://x.com/Mohsin_o2/status/2107175748666896519
