Is it so different to the the offal on the TV in the West?
What I want to know is whether that smirking Pritiska Patelova bitch that presents these programs has been sanctioned yet?
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Concentration of forces achieving localised superiority. Ukraine is still very much outnumbered and outgunned in most capacities. The Russians are now pushing concerted advances very much like they did in the beginning of the war but I do believe their attrition is immense as well. Fighting withdrawals are almost inevitable in the face of such a concerted offensives and I think it’s important to avoid envelopements such as what’s being threatened now. Withdrawal through the gap is better than losing large numbers of men and equipment.
Imo, as with the other engagements, Russian momentum will stall at some point either by design or forced by defensive measures and counterattacking forces need to be ready and available for that time. All the Ukraine can do is keep on doing what they have been and make the Russians pay for everything and the flow of arms to help them do that needs to continue without any delays or hiccups. The Russians cannot sustain their advance at the same attrition rates they’ve been getting so as long as it can be maintained, even in withdrawal actions, the possibility of counteroffensives will be there to be exploited, as was the case around Kharkiv.
It’s in the balance though, war is fucking shit.
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Is that a serious question?
The cyclic debate about the availability of weapons in the US.
The endless Hollywood and network productions that sell mirages.
The overtly opulent nature of the rich and how it is portrayed.
The aggrandisement of being famous.
The lack of reporting around the vast disparities in (most) Western countries - never mind of less developed areas.
The various wars around the world that are not convenient to highlight.
The many dodgy deals that go on between countries.
The media is a tricky(lazy?) mistress.
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See, I kinda get where you’re coming from, but you’re painting everything with the same broad brush. Is Fox News the same as CBS, BBC, or even NHK World?
It’s lazy.
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I wish I was less so.
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What a picture btw
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It’s a different front. Russian troops from the Kharkiv front were largely redeployed to the East. UA had troops there from the Kyiv battle so deployed them in the Kharkiv front. Which was successful. I did question the tactical sense of crossing the river however if they can maintain that push they will eventually reach the Eastern front (but that will be in months as it’s a long way to go).
We knew the Eastern front was under immense pressure and UA have done well to hold as long as they have (particularly considering their lack of artillary and air cover). The East was always going to give at some point even if UA had thrown everything at it. (signs of RU making gains to the East have been evident for weeks now) UA seem to have been preparing a new front behind lines in more favorable defensive positions and they are now deploying the artillary they need. In principal it should get more difficult for RU again in the East once the ‘new’ frontline is drawn up.
Still UA need more success at bringing down RU aircraft.
RU are not advancing to the North or South though it seems there’s a ‘lull’/stalemate. This could be for many reasons which could include UA rienforcing to the East now they are at a point of holding favorable terrain.
Who knows for sure?
What we do know is this situation was predictable and predicted it was a question of when?
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May 25, 7:15 pm ET
Some pro-Russian milbloggers on Telegram continued to criticize the Kremlin for appalling treatment of forcefully mobilized Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR) servicemen–contradicting Russian information campaigns about progress of the Russian special military operation. Former Russian Federal Security Service officer Igor Girkin (also known by the alias Igor Strelkov) amplified a critique to his 360,000 followers from a smaller milblogger discussing a video wherein a DNR battalion appealed to DNR Head Denis Pushilin about maltreatment of forcefully mobilized forces.[1] The milblogger blamed Russian leadership, not Pushilin, for beginning the invasion with insufficient reserves and unprepared, forcefully mobilized forces. The milblogger added that Russia did not provide the soldiers of its proxy republics with new weapons, despite claiming that Ukrainian forces prepared to attack occupied Donbas areas for a year prior to Russian invasion. The milblogger also claimed that the Kremlin failed to mobilize and adequately prepare the next batch of reserves, while Ukrainian forces are successfully preparing their troops for counteroffensives. Girkin also criticized the Kremlin for failing to pay the DNR battalion for three months. Some milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces staged the video, but the video still gathered attention of pro-Russian Telegram users.[2]
The incident highlights a continuing shift in the Russian-language milblogger information space regardless of the video’s authenticity. Milbloggers would likely have either attacked or dismissed such a video loudly and in near-unison earlier in the war, when they all generally focused on presenting optimistic pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian narratives. The response to this video in the Russian-language milblogger space demonstrates the strong resonance anti-Kremlin narratives can now have. It is impossible to know what effect this change in this information space might have on general perceptions of the war in Russia, but it is one of the most visible and noteworthy inflections in the attitudes of previously strongly pro-Kremlin ostensibly independent Russian voices speaking to Russians that we have yet seen.
Today’s statement by DNR Militia Head Eduard Basurin explaining that Russian forces would focus on creating “smaller cauldrons” rather than on a single large encirclement is likely in part a response to a critique that surfaced both in the milblogger space and in the Russian Duma that Russian forces had failed to form and reduce “cauldrons” of the sort they used in 2014.[3] Basurin’s statement, along with other changes in the ways in which Russian officials have spoken about cauldrons and Russian operations in the east following those critiques suggest that the Russian and proxy leadership is sensitive to shifts in this information space.[4]
Russian forces are increasingly facing a deficiency in high-precision weaponry. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that due to an increasing lack of high-precision weapons Russian forces are seeking other methods of striking critical infrastructure and have intensified the use of aircraft to support offensives.[5] The Ukrainian Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) noted that up to 60% of Russia’s high-precision stockpile has already been exhausted, which is consistent with previous reports by Western defense officials that Russian forces have been increasingly relying on “dumb bombs” because they are facing challenges replenishing their supplies of precision munitions in part due to sanctions targeting Russia’s defense-industrial production.[6] A lack of high-precision weapons will likely result in an increase in indiscriminate attacks on critical and civilian infrastructure.
The Kremlin is attempting to expand the pool of Russian passport-holders in occupied areas. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree on May 25 that will simplify the procedure for obtaining a Russian passport within Kherson and Zaporizhia Oblasts.[7] This renewed campaign of so-called ”mass passportization” is occurring in occupied territories and likely represents an effort to set conditions for some sort of post-conflict political arrangement (the precise form of which Putin prefers remains unclear) through manipulating access to Russian citizenship.[8] Occupation authorities may additionally attempt to exploit this new decree to carry out covert mobilization in occupied areas, as having a Russian passport would make conscription-eligible residents of occupied territories subject to forced military service.
The Kremlin and Russian military commanders are introducing new regulations aimed at addressing the diminishing level of combat-ready reserves. The Russian State Duma and the Russian Federation Council passed a bill raising the maximum age for voluntary enlistment into the Russian military from 40 to 50.[9] Russian Telegram channels also reported that Russian leadership forced operational officers and commanders of the Russian Border Guards of southern Russian regions including Rostov Oblast and occupied Crimea to indefinitely cancel all summer vacations–a rather unsurprising step in light of the military situation in principle, but an indication of the next source of manpower to which Putin will apparently turn.[10] Russian Border Guards will reportedly deploy to training grounds for unspecified exercises in late May. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces are forming new reserve units within the Southern Military District.[11]
Key Takeaways
- Russian forces prioritized advances east and west of Popasna in order to cut Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) southwest of Severodonetsk and complete encirclement efforts in Luhansk Oblast.
- Russian forces have likely entered Lyman and may use this foothold to coordinate with advances southeast of Izyum to launch an offensive on Siversk.
- Russian forces may start the Battle of Severodonetsk prior to completely cutting off Ukrainian GLOCs southwest and northwest of Severodonetsk.
- Russian forces struck Zaporizhzhia City in an attempt to disrupt a key logistics hub for Ukrainian forces operating in the east.
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