Needs translation to English from Russian, talks about the tons of fiber optic cable on the frontline and the impact on ecology. Of course it’s only a part of it when considering the war in general, but it’s unprecedented since it’s the first drone war.
The transition has started as expected with some friction.
The five key principles of the announced reforms
Decentralized decision-making: Battalion and brigade commanders would receive broader authority to make operational decisions on the ground without lengthy approval from higher headquarters.
Priority on preserving personnel: The doctrine of “holding positions at any cost” would be replaced by maneuver defense. No unit would be required to hold a position if doing so risks encirclement or unjustified losses.
Technology first: Expanded deployment of drones, electronic warfare systems, and robotic platforms down to the company and battalion level. Whenever possible, technology should accomplish the mission before infantry is committed.
Audits and rotation: A transparent evaluation process for commanders would be introduced. Officers who fail to demonstrate adaptability and concern for their troops would be removed from leadership positions.
Bureaucratic amnesty: Paperwork and procedures for writing off damaged or lost equipment would be significantly simplified for units operating on the front line.
1 Like
The expert is candid about the program’s limitations, citing open-source analysis showing that of twenty-three verified Flamingo launches, only six hit their targets and just two struck the intended facility, with production still limited to a handful of missiles daily. He also notes that the manufacturer’s credibility took a hit from a National Anti-Corruption Bureau investigation, leaving transparency questions unresolved.
Thread worth opening, it has a very comprehensive analysis and recap of the past month.
1 Like
Seems quite reasonable to me; offers commanders on the ground the opportunity to adapt and implement ad hoc solutions that work instead of being bound by a strict command authority that can sometimes out of touch of a fluid situation. Also allows commanders to preserve the lives of their troops instead of holding ground just to be flanked and encircled anyway. To be completely honest, that all makes perfect sense and is a very Western way of thinking. What’s with the friction?
2 Likes
I totally agree with you, and in any case, they have to find different solutions due to the asymmetry of power.
I was talking of the friction in terms of moving from the old approach to the new and in the transition of power.
1 Like
It’s been a week, the situation has followed the following pattern every day:
- Russia sends missiles and Ukraine doesn’t have any air defense for those
- Ukraine continues putting on fire Wildberries and petrol
Because there’s no air defense, Ukraine is starting to get hit a bit everywhere (a lot of petrol stations, and last night in Kyiv a lot of different businesses), 17 deaths yesterday in Kyiv.
This is quite worrying trend, and outside of US sending Patriots (which they don’t), there’s precious little solutions in the short term.
On top of that, North Korea is sending missiles to Russia (see below).
Trump continues to flip flop and it seems the MAGA base turning pro Ukraine is more of a PR campaign for the elections coming soon than a real policy change (which some people have been warning about).
https://x.com/jimsciutto/status/2084960315964260651
4 Likes
Drone loaded with explosives found in Leipzig airport:
Ukraine has announced they are proceeding and continuing with their summer drone campaign.
1 Like
Lastly I forgot to talk about the Russian essentially stopping the transit of commercial boat through the Black Sea though strikes on all boats.
2 Likes
All of this is tragic.
2 Likes
After another week in Ukraine, numerous conversations with soldiers—including three colonels of the Ukrainian armed forces—and many positive but also sobering impressions, here is my assessment of the current situation in the Russian-Ukrainian war. !
The cautious optimism of early summer has largely evaporated on the Ukrainian side. As recently as June, there was hope that the intensifying Ukrainian attacks on Russian logistics in the occupied territories and deep in the Russian hinterland could sustainably weaken the invasion army and bring its offensive to a halt. This expectation has not yet been fulfilled. The extraordinarily high Russian casualty figures since the start of the year have also only partially produced the hoped-for strategic effect so far. While the pace of the Russian advance has noticeably slowed, it has not been stopped. At the same time, numerous soldiers report a clear intensification of Russian attacks on positions at and behind the front. Russia is now deploying significantly more kamikaze drones, glide bombs, and long-range weapons than just a few months ago. The approach increasingly feels systematic: forest belt by forest belt, village by village, and bridge by bridge are being destroyed to sustainably weaken Ukrainian logistics behind the front. Even far behind the front, a new quality of Russian warfare is emerging. While Russia has frequently targeted gas stations, logistics centers, or civilian infrastructure at random in recent years, Ukrainian officers now observe a markedly more systematic campaign against the Ukrainian supply structure. Notably, Russia is now attacking logistics centers on a similar scale to what Ukraine does on Russian territory—albeit with far greater firepower. Many of these facilities are located along key highways. During our trip, we passed numerous logistics sites that had been destroyed just hours or days earlier. Unlike Ukraine, which predominantly uses precision weapons for such strikes, Russia often deploys ballistic missiles or entire swarms of Shahed drones. The result is far greater destruction around the actual targets, along with correspondingly high casualty figures. From the numerous conversations with Ukrainian soldiers, two distinct assessments of the further course of the war emerged.
The more optimistic view is: If the West—particularly Germany—continues to support Ukraine consistently, this war can ultimately be won. The underlying conviction is that the economic and industrial capacity of the Western supporters could lead to a resource advantage over Russia in the long term. However, I only partially share this assessment. Russia continues to receive substantial military and industrial support from China, North Korea, and Iran. These factors make a prolonged war of attrition extremely challenging from a Ukrainian perspective.
According to this, the Ukrainian deep strikes primarily serve the purpose—or the hope—that Russia must abandon its war aims politically or economically before it can fully achieve its military objectives. In the best case, through a downfall of Putin from within his own ranks. Whether that ever happens, “we’ll only know on the day it does,” the officer said.
4 Likes